Your session is about to expire due to inactivity. You will be automatically signed out in 120 seconds.120 seconds.

• Logistics Health Readiness Group
• Lhi Medical Readiness
• Logistics Health Portal
• Logistics Health Readiness Login

Logistics Health Incorporated (LHI) is in receipt of the Revdex.com (Revdex.com)'s Complaint ID#redacted received in LHI's offices on May 27, 2015, regarding redacted concerns about herrecords not being forwarded to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) a week after her appointment fora compensation and benetit examination.It appears. LHI operates a suite of 24/7 contact centers staffed with a variety of agents with diverse training, including everything from adminstrative and scheduling staff to medical health professionals. When outsourcing your workforce health care needs, you want professionals who offer consistency, proven quality and quick response. There was no award then, only a pre-award protest by Logistics Health. Leidos continues to face off against a disappointed incumbent that claims it should have won the Army's $900 million Reserve.

By David Beaumont.

When we think of readiness, we tend to confuse it with preparedness terms such as a ‘notice to move’. However, it is common to find that despite a unit being well within its designated ‘notice’ when time comes for action, the unit is constrained because of the availability of kit, a lack of enabling elements available in supporting formations, the slow activation of national commercial resources by strategic organisations as well as a variety of other logistics factors. In some cases, strategic-level decisions result simply because available capabilities cannot be appropriately sustained and, accordingly, are unable to be deployed. Sometimes conscious decisions result in considerable advance moves based on combat forces being available, only to find these forces combat ineffective until the logistics ‘tail’ catches up. Operational experiences from Operations Desert Shield and Storm exemplify this problem; although there was reason to have coalition forces available soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 as a disincentive to further aggression, it took six months before the coalition force was logistically ready for a major combat operation.

In other situations, we can see a litany of logistics readiness issues transpire directly onto operational outcomes. This is especially the case for expeditionary operations and campaigns that require the deploying force to conduct operations virtually instantaneously. During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 the US Government Accountability Office saw massive discrepancies in stocks due to visibility issues, equipment was being cannibalised because materiel readiness was at a poor level, and the supply chain was in discord. Similar concerns, albeit on a smaller scale, had been identified by Australian Government auditors with reference to deployments to East Timor at the turn of the century. No operation is free of friction caused by logistics, but in each of these examples the readiness of respective logistics systems was inadequate, under-resourced and inefficient.

Results in logistics are a consequence of a process; a process involving numerous capabilities, agencies and organisations and takes resources made available to the military at the strategic level of war and converts them to combat power at the tactical. Or, to paraphrase Rear Admiral Henry Eccles, logistics is the ‘bridge’ which takes national resources and applies them on the battlefield.[1] In times of peace all activities which occur within this ‘bridge’, properly controlled and coordinated, ultimately contribute to the overall ‘readiness’ of the logistics system to act when it is required. Many of the operational issues alluded to above directly resulted from how the logistics process was ill-suited to the demands of the operation which eventuated. Some of the logistics deficiencies identified might have been directly addressed through improvements in resourcing. However, there are other equally influential factors that are essential for logistics readiness, and the early performance of the logistics process at during an operation.

Fundamentally, logistics readiness refers to the ability to undertake, to build up and thereafter to sustain, combat operations at the full combat potential of forces.[2] It comprises actions undertaken during operations, but is predominantly a consequence of routines and practices set in organisation behaviour long before deployment. It is not a simple matter of issuing logistics units their own ‘notice to move’ or applying some other metric that will inevitably be ‘crashed’ through in a time of crisis; rather logistics readiness is a function of total organisational performance and efficiency. This standard of performance is achieved by addressing six key factors that are applicable at all levels – from the strategic to the tactical. These factors are as follows:

Mutual Understanding: There must be a mutual understanding between commanders and the logistics units, agencies and organisations that support them. This is founded on a clear enunciation of commander’s intent, but also the culture of cooperation set within the military or formation. It also recognises that there must be timely exchanges of information; one of perennial challenges in supporting operations is knowing how far to compartment operational information, especially with commercial partners.

Balance between logistics and combat resources and elements. There must be an appropriate balance of logistics resources to the combat elements. This is captured in the idea of the ‘tooth-to-tail’ ratio, and will be discussed later. However, logistics resources can be appropriated by a variety of means and may include public service or commercial operations as well as those in uniforms. Furthermore, we should not forget Dr James Huston’s (Sinews of War) view, ‘the important factor is the total amount of firepower which can brought to bear …. If the greatest total of effective power can be delivered with on combat man for each service man, then this is the desirable ratio; but if 1000 service troops for one combat man are needed to achieve that maximum, then that is the desirable ratio.’[3]

Logistics plans and policies. Logistics plans and policies, from stockholding policies at the unit and formation level right up to national mobilisation plans at the grand strategic / economic level must be available. Format and bulk of plans are less important than those that are developed through interagency effort, and reflecting the nature of an efficient and effective logistics process.

Logistics organisation. Logistics organisations must be structured to support operational requirements rather than bureaucratic needs. Although organisations may not need to be resourced to their full wartime capability during most periods (and rarely are because to do so would be cost prohibitive), the organisational architecture must be established to enable the transition to an operational footing and policies in place to enable such a transition to occur rapidly.

Materiel readiness. There must be a high state of materiel readiness across the force. In addition to appropriately funding the sustainment of equipment, and the establishment of appropriate stockholdings in appropriate areas to enable operational contingencies, the means of sustaining equipment must be as appropriate for support operations as they are for efficiency in garrison. Failures in materiel readiness in garrison are often replicated in major sustainability issues on operations, and necessitate consequential actions such as cannibalisation to achieve desired operational readiness outcomes.

Testing the logistics organisation. The logistics process, capabilities and organisations must be systematically assessed for its readiness. Every military activity or exercise is an opportunity for assessing logistics performance, but it is rare that military exercises comprehensively test and assess operational sustainability and logistics readiness with rigour. Fewer still are those exercises that test logistics readiness through a major deployment performed at short-notice; a phase of an operation that demands all supporting agencies are ready.

US Army 1st Cavalry Division preparing to attack, Operation Desert Storm, 1991

Of course, it is hard to remove any discussion on logistics readiness without referring to the capacity of the logistics ‘tail’. It may seem that it is easier to build up logistics forces, and support organisations, than it is to have combat forces at national disposal. This is because it is generally easier to procure equipment for logistics purposes than it is for combat forces, there is assumed familiarity between logistics operations and industrial activities which suggests that any conversion between the two is relatively simple, and there is always the possibility that the commercial sector can be turned to overcome any deficiencies there may be in organic logistics capabilities. Programs such as the US Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), employed extensively in operations in the Middle-east since 2002, are a manifestation of these perceptions. But they are also perceptions which tend to ignore the importance of logistics readiness to the overall employability of the force. Even if the ease of raising these logistic capabilities were a simple task, to take it for granted that operational deficiencies can be overcome at short notice is folly. If military forces are to be responsive, fully trained and equipped logistics forces must be available; processes ranging from strategic activity to tactical action must be coherent and well-practiced. A combat force without efficient and effective logistic support is ineffectual and, in the end, a waste of organisational effort.

At the root of logistics readiness is the marriage between acquiring and maintaining military capability to have it available, and the establishment of a logistics process which enables or constrains its use operationally. National economic capabilities, acquisition process, and military capability management typically executed by Service headquarters, limit the combat forces that can be created and made available. However, it is logistics capabilities and practices that limit the forces that may be actually employed on military operations. The combat unit that is formed and given the latest technology, best armour and capable of overmatch against any possible adversary will be ineffective – undeployable in practice – without a logistics system capable of sustaining it. Logistics readiness is particularly vital for those militaries that consider themselves as expeditionary in nature, as most Western militaries like to do. Not only do robust logistics capabilities define the capacity of a military to project force, these same capabilities underwrite the ability of a military to respond quickly, affording them time to overcome the distance there may be to the operational area.

Militaries rarely assign logistics readiness issues as their highest priority to resolve. Instead they are typically consumed with ensuring that the elements at the forward edge of the operational area are as ready as practicable. Yet if compromises are made with regards to the preparedness of the logistics ‘system’ as a whole, or the logistics process is inefficient or ineffective due to poor practices and inadequate logistic discipline across the military, the readiness and preparedness of any unit destined for operations will itself be compromised. Operational reporting consistently identifies forces as having culminated as a consequence of system-wide logistics failures that may have been otherwise prevented. Less well known are the times in which senior commanders have had to make choices on which forces they chose not to deploy based on the readiness of the logistics forces and the logistics process more generally. In this regard, we start to venture into the realm of strategic decision making, where logistics truly becomes the ‘arbiter of opportunity’, if not the arbiter of choice, and the true measure of whether a military is ready for combat.[4]

David Beaumont is a serving Australian Army officer, and the thoughts here are his own. He can be followed on Twitter @davidblogistics. Image by the Australian Department of Defence.

[1] Eccles, H., Logistics in the national defense, The Stackpole Company, USA, 1959, p 53

[2] ibid, p 290

[3] Huston, J. The sinews of war: Army logistics 1775-1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, USA, 1966, p 674

Logistics Health Readiness Group

[4] See Kane, T.M., Military logistics and strategic performance, Psychology Press, USA, 2001

The following was sent to me by a recent graduate of the 21R Tech School, the Logistics Readiness Officer Course. I left this in his voice but made minor edits to formatting and grammar.

Lhi Medical Readiness

21R Tech School – Course ID J3OBR21R10L1B-I

I went through LROC from May to July of 2018. You get to spend your time in beautiful/not so exciting Wichita Falls, Texas. When I went through, it was roughly 45 academic days/365 contact hours. We were the first class going through; kind of like a beta version. We were told that three courses need to be taught in order to validate this course. As of the time of this writing, there were six testable sections (also known as blocks), each taking about a week or so to cover. The capstone of the course was completed during the final three days.

In the order it was instructed, we covered:

• Block I – Organization, Roles, and Responsibilities
• Block II – Base Supply and Materiel Management
• Block III – Fuels Management
• Block IV – Ground Transportation and Distribution
• Block V – Air Transportation and Distribution
• Block VI – Logistics Plans and Contingency Operations
• Block VII – Capstone

Each block was composed of multiple lessons. Each lesson was concluded by a small Progress Check (PC), which required a minimum of 80% to pass. Each block is concluded by a final exam, which required a minimum score of 80% as well. The typical class structure had about 16 members. In our class, we had one Lt Col, two Majors, one Capt, and the rest of us were Lts. We had a class Chain of Command that stemmed from that (flight leader, shred leaders, etc). Like any other AETC course, no tobacco use throughout the day, you can have your phone on you and use it on breaks, and there is a computer lab to access government email, AF Portal, and print needed items.

Dining

There are two dining facilities you can use: the Mesquite and the Tumbleweed. You can use them for breakfast and dinner on weekdays, and are supposed to used them for all three meals on weekends.

Lodging

The LROC course has rooms reserved at billeting for all students to use, but they are on the opposite side of the base from the schoolhouse. You WILL NOT be able to get a non-availability letter because if it. However, the governing regulations do allow you to find off base lodging, and will pay you up to the amount the on base lodging rate would have been ($60 for Sheppard AFB). I ended up getting a crash-pad three minutes off base (which I would recommend to anyone instead of lodging) since you will get a house with amenities such as kitchen appliances, good WiFi, and the joy of not being on base. Many of my classmates complained about on base lodging for a myriad of issues including: roaches in their bed/in their room weekly, A/C that didn’t work (they would set the temp to 70 degrees and it would still be 85 degrees in their room), the laundry rooms were always packed, and the overall cleanliness was sub-par.

Class Logistics

Class times typically ran from 0730-1500 with a 1.5-2 hour lunch break right at 11. It is a very relaxed environment, but everyone in our class was very respectful of the instructors and others in the class. Lectures typically lasted 45-50 minutes with a 10 min break. UOD was ABUs every day, but we were told to bring our service dress which we ended up wearing on graduation day. We wore PT gear once for our first PT session, but after that it was always civilian gear. We were required to PT three times a week (once as a class per week) which we would normally play volleyball or basketball. Seriously though, you will have plenty of time before or after class every day to hit the gym if you want. You will get holidays off, and expect a couple of AETC Family days as well. For example, being there for Memorial Day weekend meant we had Friday and Monday off.

Off-Duty Time

Wichita falls ain’t exactly your blooming metropolis. There are all the modern amenities of a small city (Wal-mart, sporting goods stores, etc). There are lots of good restaurants that aren’t chains, plenty of activities in the local and three-hour driving radius. I recommend places like the Wichita Fall Brewery. They have a trivia night every Wednesday, you can visit the wrestling museum (I know, it sounds exciting,) or the world’s smallest skyscraper. Like I said, not a blooming metropolis… but there are plenty of things to keep you busy if you look for it. A lot of people end up taking off on the weekends to bigger cities like Austin, Dallas, or Oklahoma City just for a little variety over the nine weeks. Personally, I spent time in Lawton, OK hiking and Abilene, TX visiting old friends I had been stationed with back in the day. On top of this, several of us took the time to knock out a class for our Master’s degree (you will have plenty of time to do homework). I knocked out one six-week course and made it halfway through another before graduating. Another guy actually drove down to the University of Oklahoma to take an in-person class (it was his last class) to finish his Masters. Moral of the story, you have more than enough time to do whatever. The course load is not overwhelming and the tests are fairly easy for you to take 30-60 minutes a day to review all the info covered.

Logistics Health Portal

Volunteer

Because of all the free time you will have, take advantage of the volunteer gigs they offer, or seek out your own info. Opportunities we took part in included “Texas Pit Crew” which is an animal adoption agency we spent a couple of hours with every Saturday; Special Olympics bowling every Monday; and Food Bank support (donated money and canned food).

Religious Activity

Logistics Health Readiness Login

If you are into the church scene, there are plenty of churches and other religious services offered throughout the area. Several members in my class (including myself) attended a small protestant/non-denominational church of about 400 called One Life Community Church in downtown Wichita Falls. Others attended on-base chapel services, the First Baptist Church of Wichita Falls, and more that I did not get all the information on. On top of that, we did personal Bible studies in the morning with about 4 or 5 of us a half an hour before class started every couple of days.